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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the problem of determining when a
computer agent should interrupt a person with whom it is
working collaboratively as part of a distributed, multi-agent
team, which is operating in environments in which condi-
tions may be rapidly changing, actions occur at a fast pace,
and decisions must be made within tightly constrained time
frames. An interruption would enable the agent to obtain
information useful for performing its role in the team task,
but the person will incur a cost in responding. The paper
presents a formalization of interruptions as multi-agent de-
cision making. It de¯nes a novel, e±cient approximation
method that decouples the multi-agent decision model into
separate MDPs, thereby overcoming the complexity of ¯nd-
ing optimal solutions of the Dec-POMDP model. For single-
shot situations, the separate outcomes can be combined to
give an exact value for the interruption. In more general
settings, the closeness of the approximation to the optimal
solution depends on the structure of the problem. The paper
describes domain speci¯c heuristic functions that improve
the e±ciency of the approximation further for a speci¯c ap-
plication.
1. INTRODUCTION
E®ective collaborations require a range of communications
among team members. This paper investigates one partic-
ular, important class of communication, interruptions. In-
terruptions are typically required for collaborative e®orts
when one agent on a team has information that will assist
another agent in performing some subtask or will provide
information that will enable the other agent to improve the
performance of the group activity. The need to get informa-
tion from another agent arises in mixed human-computer
teams as well as in homogeneous computer-agent environ-
ments. For example, a (human) driver may see changes in
weather conditions that a®ect route selection as they occur,
while an automated navigation system without sensors does
not. This information may be important for the navigation
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system in choosing the best route. However, interruptions
are by their very nature disruptive. The extent to which
they disrupt depends on what the person or agent being in-
terrupted is doing when the interruption occurs. Thus, it is
crucial to time interruptions appropriately. To do so requires
accurately estimating the costs and bene¯ts associated with
an interruption [10, 3].
This paper reports research that contributes to methods
for timing and managing interruptions appropriately in en-
vironments such as disaster rescue situations in which agents
are distributed, conditions may be rapidly changing, actions
occur at a fast pace, and decisions must be made within
tightly constrained time frames. In contrast to work on tim-
ing interruptions in o±ce or computer workstation settings,
the approach to interruptions in such \fast-paced environ-
ments" must take into account the high levels of uncertainty
and the limited resources (especially time) of the partici-
pants. In such settings, an accurate estimation of the use-
fulness of an interruption is especially crucial. Otherwise,
the party being interrupted may refuse to respond, treating
the interruption as an unnecessary disturbance so that it
has no positive bene¯t.
The particular problem on which this paper focuses is the
evaluation of the costs and bene¯ts associated with an inter-
ruption. Prior work on interruption management [9, 4] has
focused on the cost of interrupting a person either initially or
repeatedly. Prior work on adjustable autonomy [15] has fo-
cused on determining when a system does not know enough
and should transfer control to a person (i.e., the joint ac-
tivity will bene¯t from its doing so). The model described
in this paper takes into account the costs and bene¯ts to
two parties working together; it considers simultaneously
the utility for both person and agent in a human-computer
collaboration. Either costs or bene¯ts or both may accrue
to the person or for the system, and the overall usefulness of
an interruption requires appropriately combining informa-
tion from these two di®erent perspectives.
The paper presents a decision making model for interrup-
tion management based on the Decentralized MDP (Dec-
MDP) formalism, but addressing the problem of the com-
plexity of Dec-MDP models which are NEXP-complete [1].
We propose a novel approximate model for interruption man-
agement that decouples multi-agent decision making prob-
lems into a pair of single agent problems. This approxima-
tion method replaces the Dec-POMDP with an MDP for
one participant and a POMDP for the other participant,
thus re°ecting the di®erent information available to the two
parties. The elimination of the multi-agent decision mak-ing overhead reduces the complexity of the solution from
doubly exponential to exponential. A further reduction in
complexity to close to polynomial is shown to be possible by
combining POMDP solution techniques with domain spe-
ci¯c heuristic functions.
The research we describe uses Colored Trails (CT), a game
infrastructure that provides a clear analogue to goals, tasks,
resources and the interactions among them, but abstracts
from application domain speci¯cs [8]. CT's abstraction away
from complicated underlying domains, enables investigations
to focus on decision-making strategies, rather than speci-
fying and reasoning about individual domain complexities.
Prior uses of CT as a research test-bed for analyzing decision-
making in multi-agent contexts [8, 5] have shown it en-
gages people in playing both with other people and with
computer agents. We designed a particular CT-game en-
vironment which provides a conceptually simple analogue
of interruption-scenarios in fast-paced domains with uncer-
tainties and partial information. Though abstract, the game
remains challenging and interesting for people to play.
This paper demonstrates the usefulness of multi-agent de-
cision making models for estimating interruption outcomes
in the context of collaborative activities being carried out in
environments characterized by uncertainty and partial infor-
mation. It contributes to research on interruption manage-
ment by enabling the calculation of the expected combined
(person and agent) \theoretical" value of an interruption,
which provides an upper bound on the actual value of the
interruption. In the calculation of the theoretical interrup-
tion outcome, the player corresponding to the person is as-
sumed to be fully rational, computationally unbounded and
to act like an agent in a two agent collaboration. This cal-
culation is intended to be used as a baseline with which to
compare actual human decision-making in empirical studies
of human-computer play of the CT interruption game. Such
comparisons provide a basis for determining the kinds of bi-
ases people exhibit in such settings (i.e., the extent to which
their decisions deviate from that dictated by the optimal
calculation). An understanding of these biases will provide
the basis for the design of systems able to predict more accu-
rately a person's tendency to accept or reject an interruption
in a particular context. The paper also contributes to multi-
agent decision making research by de¯ning a novel method
for decomposing computationally expensive DecPOMDPs
into more tractable individual MDPs and POMDPs. This
approximation method can be applied to any DecPOMDP
that has a joint reward function decomposable to individual
reward functions with nearly-decomposable transition func-
tion and action sets.
The next section of this paper introduces the CT-game
environment which we use to investigate the problem of tim-
ing interruptions. Section 3 describes a decentralized MDP
model for the interruption problem, which forms the basis
for de¯ning the approximation method. Section 4 describes
the approximation method, which decouples multi-agent in-
terruption decision problem to individual models. The pa-
per concludes with a survey of related work and discussion.
2. THE CT INTERRUPTION GAME
To investigate the interruption management problem, we
developed a team game of two players in which one of the
players has information that will help the other player to
perform a task. In this game, the player that lacks infor-
mation has incentive to ask for it and the player that has
the information has a reason to provide it, because inter-
ruptions are bene¯cial for the team's work. The game is a
board game, developed using the Colored Trails (CT) in-
frastructure, played by a person and a computer agent.
The CT game board is divided into cells, and both players
and their goals are located on cells of the game board. The
players move one square at a time towards their goal squares.
Players reach their goals when they move to a square on
which their goals are located. CT's scoring function de¯nes
the overall objective of the players. It may be set so that,
the players are purely self-interested (if players' points only
depend on their own performance), or have a social good
component. The score is determined by the number of goals
reached by the players but other factors can be included into
the scoring function.
The CT \interruption game" designed for this research in-
volves two players, one controlled by a computer agent and
the other by a person, and individual goals for each of the
players. The dynamically changing nature of the real world
is modeled by having the goals move stochastically with a
probability determined by a Gaussian function with the cen-
ter at the current position of the player's goal (see Figure
1). The Gaussian function restricts the goal movement; the
goal cannot move closer to the player.
Figure 1: Left: Screenshot; me is the person player,
star is the agent player, Gme is the person's goal,
Gstar is the agent's goal. Right: Corresponding
movement function for Gme.
As part of the game setting, the person has complete in-
formation whereas the computer agent is unaware of the cur-
rent position of its goal except in the initial position. The
agent's information about its goal diminishes over time, and
its success in reaching its goal depends on getting informa-
tion from the person. Thus, interruptions initiated by the
agent are critical determinants of the result of the game.
In the CT interruption game, the cost of interruption is
set to losing the opportunity to move for one game turn.
If an interruption is established, neither player is allowed
to move for one game round. Analogously to interruption
decisions, at the beginning of each turn, the agent decides
whether to continue to move or to interrupt the person to
get information but with the cost of losing the opportunity
to move. The person is free to accept or reject an inter-
ruption request. If the person rejects the interruption re-
quest, the players continue their individual play, otherwise
an interruption is established, the agent receives the current
position of its goal and both players remain in their current
locations. Thus to make an interruption decision, the agent
should consider the tradeo® between making progress on its
current task and suspending the current task to ask for or
provide information.
When a goal is reached by a player, this player and her/itsgoal are randomly relocated on the board starting another
round of play. The game continues until a ¯xed number of
turns are played. The quicker the players reach their goals,
the more chance they have to reach additional goals and
increase their score.
The CT interruption game gives players an incentive to
collaborate by de¯ning a common scoring function S, given
below, where s is the points awarded for getting to a goal,
hk is number of turns it takes for the player to get to the
goal k, and the sum is over all goals that have been reached
by player i where A indicates agent, P indicates person.
S = SA + SP and Si =
P
k(s ¡ hk)
The objective of the players is to maximize the shared scor-
ing function S. In this setting, the agent has an incentive to
request interruptions from the person for learning its goal
position. The person has an incentive to accept the inter-
ruption requests as her success depends on the success of
the agent since they share a common scoring function.
3. DEC-POMDP FORMALIZATION OF
THE INTERRUPTION PROBLEM
The overarching goal of this research is to provide an accu-
rate estimate of the value of an interruption at a particular
time in a human-computer collaborative activity. Ideally,
the agent would initiate an interaction with the person only
when the interaction has positive value for the person. How-
ever, in many situations a person's estimate of the value of
an interruption may not match a fully rational computa-
tional estimate. Such mismatches may lead the person to
refuse to respond to an interruption, thus further decreas-
ing task performance. We are addressing this problem in
two phases. First, we obtain a baseline of the \theoretical"
value of an interruption, assuming the person to be fully ra-
tional and without any computational-resource limitations.
We then use this baseline to enable empirical investigations
of actual human behavior in mixed human-computer col-
laborative settings, and adapt the computer agent model
based on these empirical results. This paper addresses the
¯rst phase, and this section presents a computational model
that accurately captures the theoretical baseline of interrup-
tion values for the CT interruption game. Although we are
calculating the fully rational, theoretical baseline, for clarity
of presentation we continue to refer to the agent or player
with complete information as \the person player".
Although an interruption is an action taken by an agent
with partial information, this action a®ects both agents'
states, and consequently both reward functions. Thus, to
compute the value of an interruption, its e®ect on both
the person's (agent with full information) and the computer
agent's (agent with partial information) individual perfor-
mance must be taken into account. It is the aggregate of
these two e®ects that determines the interruption's value. It
is notable that from an individual perspective, the perfor-
mance of the individual being interrupted (i.e., the person)
always decreases, while the performance of the individual
making the interruption (i.e., the computer agent) may ei-
ther increase or decrease. The challenge for the interrupter
is to accurately identify situations in which the overall ex-
pected bene¯t to the team of the interruption is positive.
This section describes a Dec-MDP model for interruption
decision making. We use a Dec-MDP model to derive poli-
cies that maximize the joint reward function, because of the
uncertainty in the way state changes and the fact that the
interruption action a®ects both players. Finding optimal
solutions to the Dec-MDP problems has been proven to be
NEXP-complete [1], and the complexity of ¯nding an op-
timal solution to the Dec-MDP described in this section is
doubly exponential in the number of players and the time
horizon H. Although the optimal solution is infeasible even
for moderately sized problems, this Dec-MDP provides the
right theoretical baseline against which to compare the ap-
proximate model we de¯ne in Section 4.
The Dec-MDP model for interruption decision making in
the CT interruption game uses the following terms: B is the
set of board positions; jBj is the size of the game board;
pP;gP;pA;gA 2 B, are the positions of the person, person's
goal, the agent, and the agent's goal respectively; b is the
belief state of the agent about its goal position; for c 2 B,
b(c) is the probability of agent's goal being on square c; H is
the horizon of the game; aA 2 AA is an action for the agent,
where AA = fup;left;right;down;interruptg is the set of
actions for the agent; aP 2 AP is an action for the person,
where AP = fup;left;right;down;accept(interruption)g is
the set of actions for the person; s is the reward associated
with catching the goal; S
h is the state at time h; PM(g
0;p;g)
is the probability of a goal move from position g to posi-
tion g
0 when the player is in position p. Dec-MDP also
requires a state estimator function for updating the belief
state. The state estimator (SE) function updates the be-
lief state b of the agent to b
0 given agent position p, where
8c
0 2 B, b
0(c
0)=
P
c2B b(c) £ PM(c
0;p;c).
Our Dec-POMDP is modeled by the tuple
< I;S;Ai;T;­i;O;R;H > where I is the ¯nite set of play-
ers, I =< Person;Agent >; S is set of world states, repre-
sented as a cross product of pP, gP, pA, gA and b; A is the
set of actions, A =< AP;AA >; ­ is the set of observations
where ­ = ;; O, the observation probability function is un-
de¯ned; T : S £A£S ¡! [0;1] is the state transition func-
tion. State transition probability is basically the multipli-
cation of move probabilities of player's goals to the squares
given in the next state description, except where the agent or
the player or both reach their goals. In those cases, uniform
distribution probability is used instead of move probability
for the player that catches her/its goal. aaaa
The reward function R : S £ A ¡! R is de¯ned as,
R(S
h;A) =
￿
(s ¡ h) + b(pA) £ (s ¡ h) if pP + aP = gP
b(pA) £ (s ¡ h) otherwise
4. APPROXIMATING THE OPTIMAL
POLICY
In this section, we describe an e±cient way of approxi-
mating the joint decision making for the interruption game
with individual MDP solutions. The approximation decou-
ples nearly-decomposable Dec-MDP models into individual
decision-making constituents in such a way that the combi-
nation of the results of the two models gives an accurate es-
timation of the collaborative outcome. This approximation
reduces the complexity of decision making in such models to
the complexity of solving the individual constituent MDPs.
We describe the use of this approximation to estimate the
outcome of interruption provided individual decision making
models in CT interruption game in Section 4.1. Decision
making models for the agent and person perspectives are
presented in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. In Section 4.4,this approximation approach is generalized to any nearly-
decomposable decentralized decision making setting.
4.1 Decoupling to Single Agent Decision
Making
This section presents an approximate algorithm for deter-
mining agent decisions in the CT interruption game. The
collaborative value of interrupting the person is approxi-
mated by decoupling the Dec-MDP model described in Sec-
tion 3 into two individual decision models, one for the agent
and one for the person perspectives, and then combining the
outcome of individual models.
The optimal value for an interruption is estimated by the
Expected Outcome of Interruption (EOI) which is the dif-
ference between the Expected Utility (EU) of the current
state when the interruption is established and the EU when
no interruption is established.
EOI = EU
I ¡ EU
NI
where EU
I indicates the expected utility of interruption,
and EU
NI indicates the expected utility of no interruption.
An interruption is bene¯cial when EOI is positive.
Having two di®erent players leads to two di®erent per-
spectives on the interruption outcome; EOIP is the person's
perception of interruption outcome which we will refer to as
\person's perspective", EOIA is the agent's perception of
interruption outcome which we call \agent's perspective".
With decoupling, EOI is approximated by combining the
value of interruption for individual perspectives of the per-
son (P) and the agent (A).
EOI = EOIP + EOIA
The EOI of a single player is the di®erence in expected
values of two possible states, one in which an interruption
is established and other in which it is not.
EOIP =EU
I
P { EU
NI
P and EOIA = EU
I
A {EU
NI
A
The expected values for individual states are provided by
the decision making models for the person (P) and the agent
(A) which are given in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. A state of the
model of the person's perspective is represented by the cur-
rent person position p, person's goal position g and current
turn number h. PM(g
0;p;g) is the probability of a goal move
from position g to g
0 with player position p. B is the set of
all board positions.
EU
NI
P = EUP(p;g;h)
EU
I
P =
P
g02B MP(g
0;p;g) £ EUP(p;g
0;h + 1)
The state of the model of the agent's perspective is repre-
sented by agent position p, agent's goal position belief state
b, and current turn h. After each turn, b is updated to b
0
using the StateEstimator(SE) function given in Section 3.
EU
NI
A = EUA(p;b;h) and EU
I
A = EUA(p;b
0;h + 1)
For any given world state, our algorithm approximates
EOI, the overall expected bene¯t of interrupting the per-
son. If EOI is estimated to be bene¯cial, an interruption
is established between the person and the agent; otherwise
both players follow their individual optimal policy. The re-
sulting policy is a complete description of the agent and
person actions. The policy is optimal for players' individual
actions, but suboptimal for the timing of interruptions. This
approximation reduces the complexity of the multi-agent de-
cision making process to that of two separate single agent
decision making processes.
4.2 Individual Decision Making Model for the
Person Perspective
The person's perspective is fully observable and is mod-
eled as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). The terms used
for the person perspective MDP formalization are as follows:
B is the set of board positions; jBj is the size of the game
board; p 2 B, g 2 B are the positions of the person and
her goal respectively; H is the horizon of the game; a 2 A
is an action where A = fup;left;right;downg is the set of
actions; s is the reward associated with reaching the goal;
PM(g
0;p;g) is the probability of a goal move from position
g to position g
0 when the player is in position p; S
h is the
state at time h.
MDP that represents the person perspective is the tuple
< S;A;T;R > where S is the set of states, expressed as a
cross product of p and g; A is the ¯nite set of allowed actions
for the person; T : S £ A £ S ¡! [0;1], the state transition
function is de¯ned as,
Pr(S
h+1 = [p
0;g
0;h + 1]jS
h = [p;g;h];a) = T(S
h+1;a;S
h)
T(S
h+1;a;S
h) =
8
<
:
PM(g
0;p
0;g) if p + a = p
0 and p + a 6= g
1=jBj
2 if p + a = g
0 otherwise
R : S £ A ¡! R , the reward function is de¯ned as,
R(S
h;a) =
￿
s ¡ h if p + a = g
0 otherwise
The value function for optimal policy calculation is:
V
¦(S
h) = maxa[R(S
h;a)+
X
Sh+1
T(S
h+1;a;S
h)£V
¦(S
h+1)]
MDPs can be solved in the number of arithmetic opera-
tions polynomial to the size of the state space, number of ac-
tions and the number of bits required to represent the tran-
sition function and the reward function [11]. We use Expec-
tiMax solution algorithm, because it is su±ciently e±cient,
simple to implement and easy to adopt to solve NOMDP
models.
V
¦ is the value function that maximizes the utility of the
person's perspective.
V
¦([p;g;h]) = maxa[R([p;g;h];a)
+
X
c2B
T([p + a;c;h + 1];a;[p;g;h])
£ V
¦([p + a;c;h + 1])]
where S
h = [p;g;h]. ExpectiMax algorithm constructs a
decision tree that computes the value function V
¦. Starting
from an initial state, ExpectiMax branches into two levels,
one branch over the four possible actions, and the other
over the jBj possible positions to which the goal can move.
The expected outcome is calculated by taking the weighted
average of the outcome of each branch with its branching
probability. The size of the decision tree is (jBj £ jAj)
H
which is exponential in the length of the horizon. With
memoization, the number of nodes visited by the complete
policy search is bounded by jBj
2 £ jHj and the solution
becomes practical.4.3 Individual Decision Making for the Agent
Perspective
Agent decision making is modeled with a No Observation
Markov Decision Process (NOMDP) because the interaction
component is excluded from the individual model.
The terms used for the agent perspective NOMDP for-
malization are as follows: B is the set of board positions;
jBj is the size of the game board; p 2 B is the position of
the agent; b is the belief state of the agent about its goal
position; for c 2 B, b(c) is the probability of agent's goal
being on square c; H is the horizon of the game; a 2 A is
an action, where A = fup;left;right;downg is the set of
actions; s is the reward associated with catching the goal;
S
h is the state at time h. The state estimator (SE) function
updates the belief state b to b
0 given agent position p, where
8c
0 2 B, b
0(c
0)=
P
c2B b(c) £ PM(c
0;p;c).
The NOMDP that represent the agent perspective is the
tuple < S;A;T;R > where S is the set of states, expressed
as a cross product of p and b, A is the ¯nite set of allowed
actions for the agent, T : S£A£S ¡! [0;1] state transition
function is de¯ned as,
Pr(S
h+1 = [p
0;b
0;h + 1]jS
h = [p;b;h];a) = T(S
h+1;a;S
h)
T(S
h+1;a;S
h) =
￿
1 if p + a = p
0 and SE(p
0;b) = b
0
0 otherwise
R : S £ A ¡! R the reward function is de¯ned as,
R(S
h;a) = b(p) £ (s ¡ h)
The value function for optimal policy calculation is:
V
¦(s) = maxaR(S
t;a) +
X
St+12S
T(S
t+1;a;S
t)V
¦(S
t+1)
The set of initial states is the ¯nite combination of agent
positions and goals. An in¯nite number of state possibili-
ties exist, because the belief distribution is incorporated into
the state space, however only small regions of the state space
are reachable from the ¯nite set of initial positions. In order
to eliminate the unreachable states and only consider those
that are reachable, we customize the well-known Expecti-
Max algorithm, which is a version of Value Iteration that
focuses on reachable states [13].
V
¦ is the value function that maximizes the utility of the
agent's perspective.
V
¦([p;b;h]) = maxa[R([p;b;h];a) + (1 ¡ b(p))
£ V
¦([p + a;SU(p + a;b);h + 1])]
where S
h = [p;b;h]. Starting from an initial state, a policy
tree is constructed that maximizes the value function V
¦.
At each level, the tree selects an agent action that maximizes
the value function and the agent's belief state is updated by
the Special Update (SU) function (See Appendix 2 for the
SU function). The branching continues until the horizon is
reached. Even with dynamic programming, the complexity
of the complete search is exponential in the length of the
horizon, (jAj £ jBj)
H.
To overcome this complexity, we de¯ne a domain speci¯c
heuristic to cut down the search space. A basic heuristic
for the CT interruption game is selecting actions that take
the agent closer to its goal. To have a more e±cient policy
search algorithm, this heuristic is integrated into the com-
plete search algorithm. While constructing a policy tree,
only actions that take the agent closer to its goal are in-
cluded in the search.
Figure 2 compares the running times of exact and heuristic-
approximate NOMDP search algorithms. By pruning moves
that are estimated to be unbene¯cial, the branching factor
becomes either 1 or 2 for each node of the decision tree. For
the CT interruption game where jAj = 4 and complexity
of the exact search is (4 £ jBj)
H, the best case complexity
of the heuristic-approximate NOMDP search algorithm is
H £ jBj.
Figure 2: Comparison of exact algorithm and
heuristic-approximate algorithm running times
The optimality of the heuristic-approximate policy search
algorithm depends on the characteristics of the setting. Ex-
periments on a CT Interruption game with moderate uncer-
tainty (0.5 goal movement probability, 1.0 Gaussian variance
(see Appendix 2 for the goal movement calculation)) shows
that in 3% of the states, the best action assignment di®ers
for the approximate-heuristic and exact policies. In such
states, an action that takes the agent away from its goal
is preferred, as this action limits its goal's movement and
helps the agent to reach its goal faster. If the environment
is certain, the heuristic-approximate algorithm is equivalent
to the exact solution. When uncertainty is high in the en-
vironment, it is possible that this simple heuristic becomes
insu±cient and diverges from optimality. In this case, more
sophisticated heuristics can be introduced to achieve better
accuracy.
For our experiments, we used a heuristic that was speci¯c
for the CT interruption game. Heuristics that are suitable to
the properties of the model should be explored to generalize
the heuristic search approach to di®erent settings. If such
heuristics exist for the given setting, combining them with
policy search methods is promising to signi¯cantly increase
the e±ciency of the solution.
4.4 Analysis of the Approximation Method
Previous sections have described how decoupling a single
decentralized decision making model into individual mod-
els provides e±ciency gains in the CT interruption game
setting. This approximation method can be further general-
ized to collaborative decentralized decision making problems
that are nearly decomposable to individual models. The
necessary conditions for applying the decoupled approxima-
tion techniques are having a joint reward function that can
completely decompose into individual rewards and a joint
transition function. This section describes a generalizationof our approximate approach to general problems that sat-
isfy this set of conditions.
In a general fully collaborative setting, there exists a set of
agents I = fI1;:::;Ing which share a common reward func-
tion R that is a combination of individual reward functions
R1;:::;Rn:
R(R1;:::;Rn) ! <
The agents have a single joint action JA to be taken when all
n agents agree on doing JA and a set of individual actions.
When agents do not agree on taking action JA, the agents
act individually. The individual decision making model of
agent i selects the best individual actions ai for the current
state Si. The estimated outcome of agent i for taking JA is
calculated using two possible next states S
JA
i and S
NJA
i of
agent i, which are explored by feeding the joint transition
function T with Si and JA. S
JA
i = T(Si;JA) is the next
state of agent i after taking JA. S
NJA
i = T(Si;ai) is the
next state of agent i after taking individual best action ai
(NJA refers to \No Joint Action").
From the individual decision making model of agent i, two
expected utility values are extracted; EUi(S
JA
i ) which is the
expected utility of agent i at state S
JA
i . EUi(S
NJA
i ) which
is the expected utility of agent i at state S
NJA
i .
The expected outcome (EO) of taking joint action JA is
calculated as:
EOJA =R(EU1(S
JA
1 );:::;EUn(S
JA
n ))
¡ R(EU1(S
NJA
1 );:::;EUn(S
NJA
n ))
For any time step t, EOJA is calculated for the current world
state. JA is taken when EOJA is positive. Otherwise indi-
vidual optimal policies are followed.
The approach given above has two assumptions. It is as-
sumed that the model has a single joint action and the de-
terministic transition function maps a given state to a single
next state given action JA. Both of these assumptions can
be relaxed. Given multiple joint actions JA1;:::, JAK, EO
values are estimated for every JAi. Among positive EOJAi
values, the joint action with highest EOJAi is selected as
the next action. If the joint transition function maps a cur-
rent state S and joint action JA to a set of next states S
t+1
j ,
EOJA is calculated as the weighted sum of S
t+1
j with corre-
sponding transition probabilities.
As a result of the high complexity of constructing the opti-
mal joint policy, we cannot provide an empirical comparison
of the approximate policy with the optimal policy. However,
observations of the agent player's interruption decisions dur-
ing empirical studies using the CT interruption game, sug-
gest the policy generated by the approximate method leads
to good decisions. The agent appears to interrupt only when
its goal has moved signi¯cantly. This behavior results from
the approximate method embodying individual policies for
the agent which are optimal, and interruption decisions that
consider the e®ect of an interruption for both players. The
person is only interrupted if the expected value of the in-
terruption is larger than the expected value of acting in-
dividually. The method also takes into account the near
decomposability of the problem and the additive structure
of the reward function.
In calculating an expected value of a given world state
with the decentralized MDP model in CT interruption game,
Dec-MDP uses look ahead and includes the e®ect of future
interactions in the utility calculation. The optimal joint
policy may schedule multiple interruptions to maximize the
joint reward. In contrast, our approximation method only
includes the immediate e®ect of the interruption in the ex-
pected outcome calculation by ignoring the future possibil-
ities of interaction. This is one reason why the joint policy
constructed by our approximate method is sub-optimal. On
the other hand, for single-shot games, where the agent is al-
lowed to interrupt only once, the value for interaction is the
same between the optimal policy and the approximate pol-
icy. If joint actions are always unbene¯cial for the collabo-
rative bene¯t, then the policy generated by the approximate
algorithm is optimal because in this case the optimal joint
policy is just the combination of optimal individual policies.
The approximation method is expected to diverge from the
optimal policy as the number of joint actions increases.
In many human-computer interaction settings, the inter-
action frequency is much lower than the frequency of indi-
vidual actions taken by the computer agent and the person.
In such settings, having optimal policies for individual ac-
tions and sub-optimal timing for the joint actions may be
preferred for avoiding the signi¯cant overhead of solving the
decentralized decision model. Therefore, we believe that this
approximation may be useful for many human-computer in-
teraction settings.
Our future work focuses on investigating the e®ect of in-
teraction frequency on the optimality of approximate policy.
We know that the approximate policy is optimal if there is
no interaction and wish to determine the accuracy of our
approximate algorithm as it is modi¯ed to produce multiple
interruptions.
5. RELATED WORK
Optimally solving Dec-MDP models is known to be NEXP
[1], making it necessary for us to investigate an e±cient ap-
proximation to Dec-MDP solutions in the CT interruption
setting. Several approximate solution methods have been
investigated in prior work that also aimed to overcome the
complexity barrier. This section brie°y compares our ap-
proach to these alternatives.
Joint Equilibrium based Search for Policies (JESP) use
dynamic programming to reach local optima [12], and its
worst case complexity is greater than what we achieve with
our approach. Several proposals rely on problem speci¯c
heuristics [14, 16]. Such problem speci¯c heuristics do not
address the general human-computer interaction settings con-
sidered in this paper. Xuan et al. introduces multiple heuris-
tic functions to make communication decisions. Their hy-
brid heuristic is similar to our Expected Outcome of Inter-
ruption calculation [16]. It compares the information gain
with the communication cost to decide whether to commu-
nicate, but the introduction of their idea is primarily to
give details of such calculation. Our work can be consid-
ered as an extension that investigates the applicability of
this approach in more detail. Beynier et al. is interested
in more general settings in which time and resource con-
straints exist between multiple decentralized collaborative
agents [2]. Similar to our approach, their work estimates
the optimal joint policy by creating individual optimal poli-
cies for agents. Their work focuses on scheduling individual
tasks by considering time and resource constraints. They
don't consider the problem of estimating the value of joint
actions. In future work, we hope to combine our EOI cal-
culation with this algorithm to ¯nd new ways to better es-timate the value of interruption.
The multi-agent decision making literature presents a va-
riety of models that consider communication as a compo-
nent of decision making. Decentralized Partially Observ-
able Markov Decision Process with Communication (Dec-
POMDP-Com) is an extension of the Dec-POMDP frame-
work that has a distinct component for deciding when and
how to communicate. Finding optimal solutions to Dec-
POMDP-Com models is as hard as optimally solving Dec-
MDP models [7]. For our problem, Dec-MDP-Com does
not provide a more powerful representation than Dec-MDP
models. Having an individual communication component as
Dec-POMDP-Com models do, is not compatible with the
interruption management problem, because it is necessary
to incorporate interruption into the general decision making
to investigate the trade o® between acting individually and
initiating interruptions.
A more general framework that covers cases in which
agents may have di®erent models is the Interactive Par-
tially Observable Markov Decision Process (I-POMDP). I-
POMDP allows de¯ning individual reward functions for agents
and therefore representing their preferences [6]. We will in-
vestigate I-POMDPs in future work, after collecting data for
human behavior in CT interruption game.
6. CONCLUSION
Accurately calculating the expected costs and utilities of
interruptions, taking into account the perspectives of both
the interrupter and the party being interrupted, is impor-
tant for e®ective interruption management. This paper in-
vestigates the estimation of interruption outcomes for two-
party, collaborative human-computer activities in environ-
ments in which conditions may be rapidly changing, actions
occur at a fast pace, and decisions must be made within
tightly constrained time frames. This estimation problem is
a new, interesting area of application for Dec-MDP meth-
ods. The paper presents a novel approximation approach
which decouples computationally expensive Dec-MDPs into
multiple individual MDP models and then recombines the
interruption output of the models to provide an estimate
of the multi-perspective, collaborative value of an interrup-
tion. This approximation technique can be generalized to
Dec-MDPs that have completely decomposable joint reward
functions and nearly decomposable transition functions and
action sets. The approach provides signi¯cant e±ciency
gains when compared with the complexity of ¯nding op-
timal solutions. In future work, we plan to compare the
results of this approach empirically to exact methods and to
other approximate solution methods to provide a detailed
optimality and e±cient analysis.
7. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The initial design of the CT interruption game was sug-
gested by David Sarne to whom we are also grateful for
many insightful discussions about interruption management.
We thank David Sarne, Philip Hendrix and Heather Pon-
Barry for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
The research reported in this paper was supported in part
by NSF grants IIS-0222892 and CNS-0453923 and in part
by contract number 55-000720, a subcontract to SRI Inter-
national's DARPA Contract No. FA8750-05-C-0033. Any
opinions, ¯ndings and conclusions, or recommendations ex-
pressed in this material are those of the authors and do not
necessarily re°ect the views of NSF, DARPA or the U.S.
Government.
APPENDIX 1: Creating Compact State Space
The set of con¯gurations of our game framework is the com-
bination of possible board positions of agent, person, and
their individual goals. Using the symmetric geometry of
our game board signi¯cantly reduces the search space to be
considered to construct a complete policy.
Figure 3: 4 symmetries divide game board into 8
symmetric pieces.
The game board has vertical (V), horizontal (H), and 2
diagonal (D1 and D2) symmetries that divide the board into
8 regions (see Figure 3). Every point in the game board
can be transformed into the selected region by using these
symmetries. Table 1 shows the set of symmetries that maps
any point on the given board into region 1.
Region Transformations Region Transformations
1 - 5 H, V
2 D2 6 D1
3 H, D1 7 H, D2
4 V 8 H
Table 1: Symmetry transformations that maps given
regions into region 1
If a goal position is transformed into region R with a set
of symmetries S, applying S to the player position preserves
the relative positions of the player and the goal. A com-
plete policy calculated for every initial state that has its
goal position inside region R, is indeed a complete policy for
the full game board as each initial state corresponds to a
calculated con¯guration on region R. Therefore the size of
the complete policy and the number of calculations required
reduces to 1/8.
APPENDIX 2: CT Interruption Game Speciﬁc
Functions
We present three CT interruption game speci¯c functions
that are used in Section 3 and Section 4 to update the belief
state of the agent.
SpecialUpdate (SU) function is a special state estimator
function that performs a game speci¯c update on the beliefAlgorithm 1 GaussianTable: Constructs a probability ta-
ble that holds probability of goal's movement from initial
position g to each board position
Require: Updated player position p
0, goal position g, gaus-
sian variance ¿
Ensure: Corresponding Gaussian Table GT
for each cell c 2 B do
if distance(c,p
0)<distance(g,p
0) then
set Table(c) = 0
else
set Table(c)=
e
¡distance(c;g)
¿2
2¦¿2
end if
end for
normalize GT
return GT
Algorithm 2 PM: Calculating goal's movement probability
to a given cell
Require: Updated goal position g
0, updated player posi-
tion p
0, current goal position g
Ensure: Probability of goal g moving to position g
0
GT = GaussianTable(p
0,g)
return Table(g
0)
state before branching the policy tree to the next time steps
(see Section 4.3 for more information). Given that pA is the
current position of the agent, branching to the next time
step without reaching to the goal indicates that the goal
is not located on position pA. b is updated accordingly by
setting b(pA) to 0. Next, b is normalized in a way that
the distribution sums to 1, and it is updated with the state
estimator function (see Section 4.3 for SE function).
Algorithm 3 SpecialUpdate (SU): Special Update to given
Belief State
Require: Player position p, belief state b
Ensure: Updated belief state b
0
set b(p)=0
normalize b
b
0 = SE(p;b)
return b
0
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